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UTAH IDAHO GRAIN EXCHANGE, 
a non-profit corporation, 
AMICUS CURIAE 
Case No. 14111 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE 
CASE 
This is an action by a grain dealer against a grower, for breach of 
contract. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
The trial court submitted the matter to a jury with respect to the 
question of whether the defendant grower was a merchant within the 
meaning of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code and, therefore, would 
come within the "merchant exception" to the general Utah Uniform 
-1 
Commercial Code statutes of frauds. The Plaintiff prevailed in the t r ia l 
court and the matter was timely appealed. This Court reversed on the 
question of whether the Defendant was a merchant within the meaning of 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, and on appeal the Defendant prevail-
ed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Amicus Curiae seeks to have the matter reheard by the Court upon 
the special finding that the Defendant and Appellant was not a M merchant 1 . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amicus Curiae does not substantially dispute the facts as set forth 
in Appellant1 s and the Respondent1 s briefs heretofore filed, and taken 
together with the facts stated in this Court1 s opinion rendered March 11, 
1976, a re adapted as Statement of Facts of Amicus Curiae* In addition, 
Amicus Curiae is interested in being heard on the petition for rehearing 
and is a non-profit Utah corporation whose members a re interested in the 
everyday transactions involved in the buying and selling of local com-
modities. 
The Utah Idaho Grain Exchange, while primari ly concerned with the 
process of inspection, also has an interest in the orderly marketing of 
commodities. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT A 
MERCHANT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH UNIFORM COM-
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MERCIAL CODE. 
This Court in its opinion found the defendant, based on the facts it 
obse rved , was not a m e r c h a n t within the conceptual meaning of the Utah 
Uniform C o m m e r c i a l Code. It is with this sole finding that Amicus 
Cur iae take exception. 
Section 70A-2-201 of the Utah Uniform C o m m e r c i a l Code provides 
that: 
, r
. • . • a cont rac t for the sa le of goods for the 
p r i c e of $500 o r m o r e is not enforceable by way 
of action or defense unless t h e r e is some writ ing 
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sa le has 
been m a d e between the p a r t i e s and signed by the 
par ty against whom enforcement is sought . . . . " 
An exception to this gene ra l provis ion is m a d e for dealings between m e r -
chants in Section 70A-2-201 (2), which s ta tes that : 
11
. . . . if within a r easonab le t i m e a writ ing in 
confirmation of the contrac t and sufficient against 
the sender is r ece ived and the par ty receiving it 
has r e a s o n to know its contents , it sa t is f ies the 
r e q u i r e m e n t s of . . . . [the Statute of f rauds] against 
such pa r ty unless wr i t ten not ice of objection to its 
contents is given within ten days after it is r e ce ived . " 
In the p r e sen t c a s e the t r i a l cour t found that t h e r e was an o r a l contract 
admit tedly for a sum in excess of $500. 00, and that wri t ten confirmation 
was mai led and rece ived by the Defendant grower within a r easonab le t i m e 
and that no wri t ten objection to its content was sent . 
Section 70A-2-104 of the Utah Uniform C o m m e r c i a l Code defines a 
m e r c h a n t a s : 
11
 (1) l Merchant I means a pe r son who deals in goods 
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of the kind o r o the rwi se by his occupation 
holds himself out as having knowledge o r 
ski l l pecu l i a r to the p r a c t i c e s o r goods in-
volved in the t r ansac t ion or to whom such 
knowledge o r ski l l m a y be a t t r ibuted by his 
employment of an agent or b roke r o r o ther 
i n t e r m e d i a r y who by his occupation holds 
himself out as having such knowledge o r 
ski l l . 
(3) 'Be tween m e r c h a n t s ' m e a n s in any t r a n s -
action with r e s p e c t to which both p a r t i e s a r e 
cha rgeab le with the knowledge or skil l of m e r -
c h a n t s . " 
It is the posi t ion of Amicus Cur i ae that the word " m e r c h a n t " is in-
co rpora ted in the Utah Uniform C o m m e r c i a l Code as a t e r m of a r t and 
it is given a specif ic definition which is not ent i re ly analogous to the 
commonly accepted definition of the term* 
Two significant dec is ions have been reached in I l l inois which Sta te 
is c lose to the g r a in t r a d e bus ines s , that is which State houses the 
Chicago Board of T r a d e . The I l l inois Appellate Cour t s w e r e split on 
the i s s u e . S ie rens v. Clausen, 21 111. App. 3d 450, 315 N . E . 2d 897 
(Third D i s t r i c t 1974),( a f a r m e r is not a merchan t ) ; Campbel l v. Y o k e l , 
20 111. App 3d 702, 313 N . E . 2d 628 (Fifth Dis t r i c t 1974) (a f a m e r is a 
m e r c h a n t ) ; Olpffson v. Coomer , 11 111. App. 3d 918, 296 N . E . 2d 871 
(Third Di s t r i c t 1973) ( f a r m e r is not a m e r c h a n t ) . Because of the im-
pact of t hese decis ions and the impact on the opera t ions of the Chicago 
Board of T r a d e , the m a t t e r was extensively br iefed and the I l l inois 
Sup reme Court decided t h e r n a t t e r in S ie rens v . Clausen, 60 111. 2d 585, 
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'328 N. W. 2d 559 (1975). In Sierens, grain elevator operators sued a 
farmer who failed to deliver on two oral forward contracts to sell 
soybeans to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that they had confirmed the 
oral contract in writing pursuant to the "merchant exception11 to the 
Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds, and in accordance with the 
usual customs of the grain business. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant 
was familiar with the custom of oral sales followed by confirmation. 
Defendant claimed that he was a farmer and not a merchant. The facts 
from the record indicated that the defendant had farmed for thirty-four 
years, had cultivated over 300 acres of corn and soybeans, and had sold 
his crops to grain elevators both under cash sales and future contracts 
for at least five years . The court held: 
11
 The practice of grain and soybean growers in 
selling their products in the manner described 
in plaintiffs1 amended complaint is well known 
and widely followed. We know of no reason why 
under the circumstances shown here the defendant, 
admittedly a farmer, cannot at the time of the sale 
be a ,merchant , .M 328 N. W. 2d at 561. 
In another case, Continental Grain Company v. Harbach, 
400 F . Supp. 695 (U.S. Dist. Court, N. D. Illinois, Sept. 9, 1975), the 
plaintiff sued an Illinois farmer, Harbach, for breach of a grain sales 
contract, involving over $10, 000. 00. The Federal Court applying substan-
tive Illinois law in a diversity case decided that the defendant was a m e r -
chant when the alleged contract was made within the meaning of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The sole issue before the Court as an issue of law 
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was whether or not the defendant farmer was a merchant, so that the 
merchant exception to the Uniform Commercial Code1 s Statute of Frauds 
would be applied. The Court decided the case by comparing the factual 
circumstances of the defendant Harbach under the Sierens case (Supra), 
and although the defendant had only sold soybeans for a few months, the 
commodity in question, the Court concluded that he was definitely a m e r -
chant within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code, a merchant 
exception to the Statute of Frauds by virtue of his general business know-
ledge,and the fact that he had made futures contracts with the Chicago 
Board of Trade and was generally familiar and understood that forward 
contracts were often made by telephone, and that buyers then confirmed 
them in writing. 
In the case at bar, the Defendant Compton testified that he had been 
a farmer for 20 to 25 years , either by himself or with his father, and 
primari ly produces hay and grain for resa le (TR. 100). The Defendant 
Compton further testified that he has two farms, one in southern Idaho 
and one in Box Elder County, both of which produce primarily grain. He 
sells grain to dealers such as Mr. Lish, and has sold to other grain 
dea lers . He testified that he had sold directly to grain storage facilities 
or marke te rs , such as Pil lsbury Company in Ogden, and had had people 
haul grain for storage and has made deals directly with the storage 
facilities and marke ters (Tr. 101). The Defendant Compton also testified 
that he had merchandized grain by making a contract ahead of the time 
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the grain is produced with the grain merchandizers . He has sold to other 
grain dealers and merchandizers , he hires employees to operate equip-
ment on his farm under his supervision and has primarily sold directly 
to the mi l l s over the 20 to 25 year period (Tr. 102). These activities 
are surely sufficient to prove that Defendant Compton, at the t ime of 
the alleged sale, was a merchant. 
In the Continental Grain Company case (Supra), the Court observed: 
uFinal ly , defendant attempts to distinguish between 
growing soybeans and selling them. He claims that 
at best he was a merchant only with respect to 
growing soybeans. Even if it were possible to thus 
parse these two stages of commercial agriculture, 
our decision res ts on defendants familiarity with 
the business practices involved, and not his know-
ledge of selling soybeans specifically. ! I 400 F# Supp. 
at 700. 
It should be noted that the only case cited by the Appellant in support 
of its position that Appellant was not a merchant is Cook Grains, Inc. v. 
Fa l l i s , 395 S. W. 2d 555, 239 Ark. 962 (1965). As far as this writer can 
determine that was the first case to pass upon the question after the 
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in several states, and it should 
be noted that it was decided at a period of t ime prior to the "Russian wheat 
deals11 and also at a t ime when the commodities markets fluctuated on a 
short term scale much l e s s than is the present condition. Both parties, 
as well as an independent witness , testified that a fluctuation of from 
$3. 63 per bushel to $4. 37 per bushel for No. 1 red wheat, from the 2nd 
through the 14th days of August, 1973, was highly unusual and nothing 
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c o m p a r a b l e had prev ious ly o c c u r r e d (R. 4 1 , 91 , 150). The Cook Grains 
c a s e h a s been cr i t ic ized by some of the legal c o m m e n t a t o r s , and in 
Anderson1 s Uniform C o m m e r c i a l Code, 2d Ed. Vol. 2, at page 221, see 
a l so , C a s e Note: Cook G r a i n s , Inc . v. F a l l i s , 65 Mich. L. Rev. 345, 
where in t h e au tho r concludes: 
' ' B e c a u s e of t h e impor tance of ag r i cu l t u r e to our 
economy, to deny t h a t a f a r m e r may be cons idered 
a m e r c h a n t is to weaken cons iderably the Uniform 
C o m m e r c i a l Code as an i n s t r u m e n t which regu la tes 
the c o m m e r c i a l affairs of t h e coun t ry . T h e r e does 
not appear to be any r ea son why the c o n t r a c t u a l d e a l -
ings surrounding the marke t i ng of f a r m products 
should not be regula ted by the s a m e laws that apply 
to o t h e r s a l e s when al l of the p a r t i e s involved a r e 
exper ienced in the type of t r ansac t ion taking place.1 1 
Regard ing t h e Cook Gra ins ca se , Amicus Cur i ae respectful ly sub-
mi t s t h a t the weight of author i ty , both in number of dec is ions and l a t e r 
d a t e s of dec is ion , is c l ea r ly to the con t r a ry . See for example Ohio Gra in 
Co. v. Swisshe lm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 69 Ohio App. 2d 192, 318 N . E . 
2d 428 (1973); Campbel l v. Yokel, 20 111, App. 3d 702, 313 N. W. 2d 628, (1974) 
(d i scussed in R e s p o n d e n t s brief and Respondent ' s brief in support of p e t i -
t ion for r e h e a r i n g ) ; S ie rens v . Clausen, 328 N . E . 2d 559 (1975); Continental 
Gra in Company v. Harbach , 400 F . Supp. 695 (U.S . Dis t . Court 111., 1975), 
a l l concluding that the f a r m e r s in the individual ca ses w e r e m e r c h a n t s . 
Amicus Cur i ae a s s e r t s that t h e r e a r e two o t h e r compell ing r e a s o n s 
why the finding of this Court concluding that the Defendant and Appellant 
Compton was not a m e r c h a n t at the t i m e of the alleged sa le should be 
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r e c o n s i d e r e d . F i r s t , if it is found that f a r m e r s who r egu l a r l y sel l the i r 
commodi t ies as opposed to the isolated casua l sa le a r e n o t " m e r c h a n t s " 
then t h e r e would be no implied war ran ty of merchan tab i l i ty with r e spec t 
to the goods o r commodi t ies involved in the s a l e . Section 70A-2-314 
imposes the implied war r an ty of merchan tab i l i ty only upon s e l l e r s who 
a r e m e r c h a n t s with r e spec t to goods of that kind. 
Secondly, to allow the decis ion to stand will force the en t i re in-
dus t ry to reduce each t ransac t ion to wri t ing and would substant ia l ly 
burden the en t i r e indust ry , including the f a r m e r who r egu la r ly se l l s his 
c r o p s . If this w e r e not done the o rd ina ry p r a c t i c e in the indust ry of an 
o r a l ag reemen t followed by confirmation would bind the gra in dealer o r 
the mi l l and not the f a r m e r . F o r example , If an o r a l ag reement had 
actually been made and was followed by wr i t ten confirmation signed by the 
gra in dea le r or b r o k e r , and had been rece ived by the f a r m e r , the f a r m e r 
would be in a posit ion to specula te on a contract to which the grain com-
pany o r dea l e r was bound f rom the moment of mai l ing the confirmation. 
Section 70A-2-201 and §70A-2~205 make it c lear that the offer confirmed 
by a me rchan t binds h im to the ag reement even without cons idera t ion . 
If the m a r k e t p r i ce fell below the cont rac t p r i c e the f a r m e r could 
hold the gra in b roke r to its ag reement , w h e r e a s , if the m a r k e t p r i c e goes 
up the f a r m e r could deny the exis tence of the contrac t a s s e r t i n g the Statute 
of F r a u d s and then se l l his crop on t h e open m a r k e t at the higher p r i c e . 
-9-
This Court concluded in its previous opinion that this was equally true 
of both par t ies . It is not equally true of both parties if the confirmation 
is mailed to the grower within a "reasonable time11. To hold that the 
grower in this case is a merchant would allow him ten days to speculate 
in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
Amicus Curiae respectfully requests the Court to consider on r e -
hearing whether under the facts the Appellant should be classified a 
"merchant" under the provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
Dated this day of April, 1976. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
^ 2 ^ 
in. R. Anderson 
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
1100 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-2506 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petition for Rehearing to Omer J . Call, Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant, 26 F i r s t Security Bank Bldg., Brigham City, Utah, 84302, and 
to J . Anthony Eyre, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, Kipp and Christian, 
Attorneys at Law, 520 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this 
13th day of April, 1976. 
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